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Contract Law/Sovereign Immunity-THE DEMISE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN THE CONTRACTUAL BATTLE AGAINST STATE AGENCIES-

Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,519 So. 2d 696
(Fla. 4th DCA 1988)

ENRICO G.

GONZALEZ

O NpealFEBRUARY
3, 1988, Florida's Fourth District Court of Apbroke new ground

in the field of public contract law by
reversing a Broward County Circuit Court decision involving two construction contractors and the City of Fort Lauderdale.' The district
court's decision in Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale2 sharply restricted the State's ability to raise the defense of
sovereign immunity in contract disputes with private parties. The
court held that where a suit is brought by a private party on an express, written contract entered into by a state agency 3 under statutory
authority,4 the defense of sovereign immunity5 will not protect the

state agency from an action arising from a breach of either an express
6

or an implied covenant or condition of the contract.
The Fourth District relied primarily on its interpretation of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. De-

l. See Champagne-Webber, Inc., v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1988). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Fort Lauderdale
after determining that each of the appellants' claims was founded upon a theory of implied
contract rather than upon the express, written contract that existed between the two parties, and
as such, each of the claims was barred by the defense of sovereign immunity. Id. at 696.
2. 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
3. A state agency may be a city, county, state department, or any other governmental
entity. FLA. STAT. § 20.03(11) (1989).
4. In Florida, most state agencies are authorized to enter into contracts. See, e.g., id. §
125.01 (county commission boards); id. § 153.62(11) (water and sewer district boards); id. §
163.370 (community redevelopment agencies); id. § 320.011 (Florida Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles); id. § 332.08(5) (municipalities); id. § 337.19(1) (Florida Department
of Transportation).
5. The Second District Court of Appeal in an earlier decision stated that:
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine designed to protect the public treasury from what
would otherwise be countless claims filed by the vast number of citizens affected by
the actions of a government ....
[S]overeign immunity, at least to the extent retained
by the legislature and courts, is a positively necessary and rational safeguard of taxpayers' money.
Southern Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Lee County, 495 So. 2d 189, 190 n.l (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review
denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987); see also infra notes 24-65 and accompanying text.
6. Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 698.
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partment of Corrections,7 where the supreme court denied the State
sovereign immunity in an action arising from the State's beach of an
express conditon of an express, written contract. 8 The Fourth District's extension of the supreme court's holding to implied conditions
and covenants of express, written contracts in Champagne-Webber is
vastly more reasonable than an earlier interpretation to the contrary
by the Second District Court of Appeal in Southern Roadbuilders v.
Lee County.9 As a result, it appears that in Florida sovereign immunity no longer will protect a state agency from an action arising from
a breach of an implied covenant or condition of an express written
contract with a private party. 10
The purpose of this Note is to explain the Champagne-Webber decision and its impact on contractual agreements between state agencies
and private parties. To that end, this Note discusses the court's decision, describes the development of the sovereign immunity defense in
contract cases, and explains why state courts and legislatures have restricted the availability of sovereign immunity in contract cases. It
also explains why the Fourth District's extension of Pan-Am Tobacco
to implied conditions and covenants of express, written contracts is
more reasonable and legally sound than the previous construction to
the contrary, particularly in light of the various alternatives to sovereign immunity.
I.

THE CHAMPAGNE-WEBBER DECISION

In Champagne-Webber, two contractors entered as joint venturers
into a written contract with the City of Fort Lauderdale (City) for the
construction of a bridge." After the contractors commenced construction on the project, they realized almost immediately that the soil conditions at the site were not as represented by the City.' 2 In soliciting
bids for the proposed project, the City had represented that the soil
conditions were loose sand only.' 3 However, instead of the sand conditions depicted in the bidders' contract plans, rock conditions were
present as well. 14 This unexpected combination of sand and rock at the

7. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
8. See Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 697.
9. 495 So. 2d 189 (Fla 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987). The
Champagne-Webber court expressly stated that its holding was in conflict with the holding in
Southern Roadbuilders. Champagne- Webber, 519 So. 2d at 698 n.2.
10. See Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 698.
11. Id. at 696.
12. Id.at 697.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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site substantially increased the quantity and scope of the work, resulting in increased costs for which the City refused to pay additional
compensation."
After the contractors completed construction of the bridge, they
filed a three-count complaint against the City. The first count, for
breach of contract, alleged four elements: (1) that the contractors had
submitted their bid proposal in justified reliance on the City's representation that the soil condition at the proposed bridge site was sand
only; (2) that the unexpected soil condition had required an alternate
and more expensive method of construction; (3) that the City had
breached the implied covenants of the contract by delaying and hindering the contractors' work progress by giving misleading and inaccurate information concerning the soil condition at the site; and (4)
that the City had breached the express covenants of the contract by
increasing the scope and quantity of work without paying for the additional costs incurred by the contractors. 16 The second count, for
breach of express and implied warranties, alleged that the City had
expressly warranted that the soil condition at the project site was loose
sand, that the City had also impliedly warranted that the plans and
drawings for the project accurately depicted the soil condition at the
project site, and that the breaches of both these express and implied
warranties resulted in increased construction costs.17 The third count
8
was an action in quantum meruit.1
At trial, the circuit court found that each of the contractors' claims
was based upon a theory of implied contract between the parties.
Therefore, the trial court determined that the contractors' claims were
barred by the defense of sovereign immunity under the Second Dis20
trict's interpretation of Pan-Am Tobacco19 in Southern Roadbuilders.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 696-97. The sheet pilings specified in the contractors' drawings could not be
driven using the "water-jet" method originally planned for in the project on the basis of the soil
conditions represented by the contract bid drawings. Instead, the contractors were forced to
install cofferdams in order to excavate the newly discovered rock before the pilings could be set
in place, resulting in more work and increased costs. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, ChampagneWebber, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (No. 4-86-2712).
17. Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 697.
18. Id. This count appears to have been included in the complaint merely as an attempt to
ensure recovery of the added expenses the appellants incurred as a result of the extra work they
were forced to do in order to properly fulfill their obligations under the contract with the City. 0
19. Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984). For a
discussion of Pan-Am Tobacco, see infra text accompanying notes 66-84.
20. Southern Roadbuilders v. Lee County, 495 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987). For a discussion of Southern Roadbuilders, see infra text accompanying notes 85-94.
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On appeal, the Fourth District Court found that the trial court
erred in dismissing the first two counts. 2' The district court explained
that, although counts one and two alleged breaches of implied covenants and implied warranties, both were claims arising out of the express, written contract between the parties. 22 Therefore, the counts
were premised upon a written contract rather than an implied contract
3
and were not barred by a claim of sovereign immunity. 2
II.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A DEFENSE IN
BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CASES

Sovereign immunity provides that neither the State nor any of its
agencies may be sued without their consent. This common law doc-

trine was first applied in England in 178824 and in the United States in
1812.25 The original basis for the doctrine in English common law was
that "the king or sovereign could do no wrong [and] was considered
untouchable and above the law. '1 26 Another consideration was that
permitting suits against the State would result in the depletion of the
state treasury, which was necessary for the government to operate on
behalf of all its citizens. 27 A final consideration was that because a
democratic government purportedly represents the people, an action
2
against the State is in effect a suit against oneself. 1
Before the turn of the century, Florida courts also recognized the
application of sovereign immunity to law suits involving the State. 29 In

21. Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 697.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 698. The court did find, however, that the quantum meruit count was, in fact, a
claim premised on an implied contract for which no written contract existed, and therefore was
correctly barred under Pan-Am Tobacco. Id. at 697.
24. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 585, 2 T.R. 667 (1788). For a detailed
discussion of sovereign immunity under English law, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HA.v. L. REV. 1, 2-19 (1963).
25. See Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). Interestingly, courts in the United States
adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity without any analysis or reasoning as to its applicability in the United States. See Comment, A Statutory Approach to GovernmentalLiability in
Florida, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 654 (1966) ("How this immunity of the king from the jurisdiction of the king's own courts came to be applied in the United States of America, where the
royal prerogative is unknown, has been called one of the mysteries of legal evolution.") (footnotes omitted); Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 H~Av. L. REv.
827, 829 (1957) ("sovereign immunity had become accepted in the United States as a natural and
fundamental principle of the law, seemingly without any attempt at justification.") (footnote
omitted).
26. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 24, 314 P.2d 278, 281
(1957); Comment, supra note 25, at 653.
27. Ace Flying Serv., 136 Colo. at 24, 314 P.2d at 281; see also supra note 5.
28. Ace Flying Serv., 136 Colo. at 24, 314 P.2d at 281; Comment, supra note 25, at 653.
29. Note, Sovereign Immunity Trilogy-Commercial Carrier Revisited But Not Refined, 10
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 702, 702-04 (1983).

1990]

SO VEREIGN IMMUNITY

two early decisions, Gay v. Southern Builders, Inc.30 and Bloxham v.
Florida Central and PeninsularR.R. ,3 the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that the State could not be sued in contract unless it expressly consented to the suit.3 2 These early decisions were strongly influenced by the concept of sovereignty. 3 The Supreme Court of
Florida reinforced these rulings in Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit v. Department of NaturalResources,3 4 where it found that
article X, section 13 of the Florida Constitution 5 provides absolute
absent an express waiver by
immunity for the State and its agencies
36
statute or constitutional amendment.
Continuing this trend, the First District Court of Appeal in Division
of Administration v. Oliff7 held the Florida Department of Transportation immune from a contract claim 38 even though section 337.19(1),
Florida Statutes,3 9 expressly waived the Department's sovereign immunity with respect to a 'claim under contract for work done." ' 40 The
court found that the plaintiff's action was not a claim for work performed under a contract, but rather was a claim for breach of a drainage easement contract on the plaintiff's property.4 1 Because statutes
waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the court rewas not premised
fused to extend the statute to cover the claim, which
4
upon a contract for work done for the Department. 1
These early cases illustrate the consistency with which the Florida
courts permitted the State, its agencies, and its subdivisions to utilize
sovereign immunity as a shield to avoid liability on contractual obligations. Even though the doctrine of sovereign immunity was developed
before the establishment of any organized government on this continent, 43 by the end of the nineteenth century American courts began to
30. 66 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1953).
31. 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902 (Fla. 1895).
32. Gay,66So. 2dat500-01;Bloxham, 35 Fla. at711-13, 17So. at918-19.
33. SeeGay,66So. 2dat501; Bloxham, 35 Fla. at711-13, 17So. at918-19.
34. 339 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1976).
35. The pertinent language of the Florida Constitution reads as follows: "Provision may be
made by general law for bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating." FLA. CO NST. art. X, § 13.
36. Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d at 1114-15.
37. 350 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
38. Id. at 486.
39. "[S]uits in law and in equity may be brought and maintained by and against the Department on any claim under contract for work done." FLA. STAT. § 337.19(1) (1989) (emphasis
added).
40. Oliff, 350 So. 2d at 486 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 337.19(1)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 24, 314 P.2d 278, 281
(1957). See generally Jaffe, supra note 24 (discussing the historical development of sovereign
immunity under English law).
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abolish sovereign immunity in whole or in part."4 In Florida, sovereign
immunity was first curtailed by judicial decision in 1957. 41 To date, all
but a handful of states have abolished or severely restricted sovereign
immunity with respect to contracts, either judicially or legislatively.4
A.

Rationalefor Restricting Sovereign Immunity

Many states have based their restriction of sovereign immunity on
the rationale that "by entering into a contract, [the State] abandons
its attributes of sovereignty and binds itself ... substantially as an
individual does when he makes a contract." 47 Perhaps more so in con-

44. See Carr v. State ex rel. Coetlosquet, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778 (1891). See generally
Comment, supra note 25.
45. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
46. A survey of the different jurisdictions yields forty-four of the fifty states completely or
substantially abrogating sovereign immunity with respect to contract claims. See Alaska: ALASKA
STAT. § 09.50.250 (1989); Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (Supp. 1989); California:
Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of San Benito, 57 Cal. 2d 508, 370 P.2d 338, 20
Cal. Rptr. 634 (1962); Colorado: Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo.
19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61 (West Supp. 1990); Delaware: George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964); Florida: Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §
50-21-1 (Supp. 1989); Hawaii: HAW. REv. STAT. § 661-1 (Supp. 1989); Idaho: Grant Constr. Co.
v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 443 P.2d 1005 (1968); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.8
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16-1.1 (Burns Supp. 1989); Iowa:
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.11 (West Supp. 1990); Kansas: Shapiro v. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 216 Kan. 353, 532 P.2d 1081 (1975); Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Louisiana: LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10; Maryland: MD. STATE
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-201 (Supp. 1989); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 12
(West Supp. 1990); Michigan: Zynda v. Aeronautics Comm'n, 372 Mich. 285, 125 N.W.2d 858
(1964); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.751 (West Supp. 1990); Mississippi: Mississippi State
Dep't v. Howie, 449 So. 2d 772 (Miss. 1984); Missouri: V.S. Dicarlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485
S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-1-404 (Supp. 1989); Nebraska: Todd
v. Board of Educ. Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 606, 48 N.W.2d 706 (1951); Nevada: NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 41.031 (Michie Supp. 1989); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491:8
(Supp. 1989); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:13-3 (West Supp. 1989); New Mexico: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23 (Supp. 1988); New York: N.Y. CT. CL. ACT art. II, § 8 (McKinney 1989);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-135.3 (Supp. 1989); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-12-02 (Supp. 1989); Ohio: Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Anderson Supp. 1989); Oklahoma: State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1975); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 30.320 (Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania: 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4651-1
(Purdon Supp. 1989); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-13.1-1 (Supp. 1989); South Carolina:
McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985); South Dakota: Blue Fox Bar, Inc. v.
City of Yankton, 424 N.W.2d 915 (S.D. 1988); Texas: TEx. CIv. PR.Ac. & REM. CODE ANN. §
107.001 (Supp. 1990); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-5 (Supp. 1989); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-192 (Supp. 1989); Washington: Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 521, 598
P.2d 1372 (1979); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 14-2-12 (Supp. 1989); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. §
1-39-104 (Supp. 1989).
47. Todd v. Board of Educ. Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 606, 610, 48 N.W.2d 706, 710
(1951); see, e.g., cases cited infra note 55.
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tracts than in torts,4 8 it appears unreasonable that the State should be
able to cry "sovereign immunity" when it breaches a contract.4 9 Indeed, to say that "the state may enter into a contract by which the
other party is compelled to expend large sums ...

to enable it to per-

form its obligation, and then [to permit the State] to arbitrarily repudiate the contract ...

would be to sanction the highest type of

tyranny." 50

government
The Supreme Court of Indiana recognized
this notion in 1891 when it stated:
In entering into the contract [the State] laid aside its attributes as a
sovereign, and bound itself substantially as one of its citizens does
when he enters into a contract. Its contracts are interpreted as the
contracts of individuals are ....

The principle that a state, in

entering into a contract, binds itself substantially as an individual
does under similar circumstances, necessarily carries with it the
inseparable and subsidiary rule that it abrogates the power to annul
or impair its own contract. It cannot be true that a state is bound by
a contract, and yet be true that it has the power to cast off its
obligation and break its faith, since that would invoke the manifest
contradiction that a state is bound and yet not bound by its
obligation."
Courts have relied primarily on the following rationale to limit sovereign immunity for contract actions: (1) "[t]o deny [a] party who has
performed his obligation under a contract the right to sue the state
when it defaults is [equivalent] to tak[ing away] his property without
compensation and . . . deny[ing] him due process"; 52 (2) "[tlo hold
that the state may arbitrarily avoid its obligation under a contract after having induced the other party to change his position or to expend
time and money in the performance of his obligations, or in preparing
to perform them, would be judicial sanction of the highest type of
governmental tyranny";53 (3) to require a citizen to "petition to the
legislature for relief from the state's breach of contract is an unsatisfactory and frequently a totally inadequate remedy for an injured
party"; 5 4 and (4) "where the legislature has by statute authorized the

48. See Note, An Insurance Programto Effectuate Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunity, 26
U. FLA. L. REV. 89 (1973) (discussing sovereign immunity in the tort context).
49. See Note, supra note 25, at 884-87 (discussing the remedies available against the United
States in light of sovereign immunity).
50. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 22, 314 P.2d 278, 280
(1957).
51. Carrv. State ex rel. Coetlosquet,, 127 Ind. 204, 206-07, 26 N.E. 778, 779 (1891).
52. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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state to enter into certain contracts, the state upon entering into such
a contract thereby consents to be sued if it breaches the contract to the
damage of the other contracting party."5"
Together, the rationale of mutuality of obligation and consent to
suit offer the most compelling argument against allowing the State to
use sovereign immunity as a shield in contract cases. First, a contract
must include mutuality of obligation, duty, and remedy between the
parties.16 Second, when the Legislature authorizes the State to enter
into a contract, the general rule is that the State waives its immunity
from suit for a breach of such contract.17 Based on these two principles, where the State enters into a contract with a private individual,
the obligations, duties, and remedies of that contract should be mutually binding and reciprocal. 8 If a State or one of its agencies enters
into a contract and accepts its benefits, expressed or implied, but then
refuses to perform its obligations or duties, express or implied, no
mutuality or fairness exists.5 9 As stated by a dissenter to a decision
upholding the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Georgia, "[w]e will
have to wait until ... some . . . state department claiming sovereign
immunity sues on one of its 'contracts' and the other party asserts
that the 'contract' is unenforceable for lack of mutuality.'"60
Those states which have not yet waived or restricted the applicability of sovereign immunity to contract claims should do so. The Ameri-

55. Grant Constr. Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 412, 443 P.2d 1005, 1009-10 (1968) (citing
Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of San Benito, 57 Cal. 2d 508, 370 P.2d 338, 20
Cal. Rptr. 634 (1962); Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314
P.2d 278 (1957); Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582
(1957); Meens v. State Bd. of Educ., 127 Mont. 515, 267 P.2d 981 (1954); Todd v. Board of
Educ. Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 606, 48 N.W.2d 706 (1951); Regents v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App.
602, 176 S.E. 673 (Ct. App. 1934)).
56. 1 S. WLLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1961).
57. 81A C.J.S. States § 172 (1977).
58. See Cig Contractors v. Mississippi State Bldg. Comm'n, 399 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Miss.
1981).
59. See id. In the construction context, the Supreme Court of California has stated that:
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably, is misled by incorrect plans and
specifications issued by the public authorities as the basis for bids and who, as a result, submits a bid which is lower than he would have otherwise made, may recover in
a contract action for extra work or expenses necessitated by the conditions being other
than as represented. This rule is mainly based on the theory that the furnishing of
misleading plans and specifications by the public body constitutes a breach of an implied warranty of their correctness.
Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of San Benito, 57 Cal. 2d 508, 510-11, 370 P.2d
338, 339-40, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634, 635-36 (1962).
60. National Distrib. Co. v. Department of Transp., 248 Ga. 451, 455, 283 S.E.2d 470, 474
(1981) (Hill, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Self v. City of Atlanta, 259
Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989).
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can Bar Association 61 calls for a waiver of sovereign immunity for
contracts. The federal government also supports such a result.
Through the enactment of three different statutes-the Contract Disputes Act of 1978,62 the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,63
and the Administrative Procedure Act64-the federal government has
65
waived its sovereign immunity in contract actions.
B.

FloridaCurtails the Use of Sovereign Immunity

On March 1, 1984, the Supreme Court of Florida judicially restricted the use of sovereign immunity in situations where a state
agency breached a contract it entered into with a private party. 66 The
court based its decision in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of
67
Correctionson the principles discussed above.
Pan-Am Tobacco entered into a written contract with the Florida
Department of Corrections whereby Pan-Am Tobacco was to install
68
and maintain vending machines in six different correctional facilities.
The contract provided that the Department could cancel the contract
as long as it gave Pan-Am Tobacco sixty days written notice and
thirty days to correct any alleged deficiencies. 69 The Department cancelled the contract, but gave Pan-Am Tobacco only thirty days written
notice and specified no deficiencies whatsoever in Pan-Am Tobacco's
70
performance.
Pan-Am Tobacco sued for breach of contract; the Department of
Corrections responded by asserting the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity. 7' The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Department. 72 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's decision, but certified to the supreme court the following
question as a matter of great public importance: "WHEN A STATE
AGENCY IMPROPERLY RESCINDS AN EXPRESS EXECUTORY CONTRACT WITH A PRIVATE VENDOR WHO SUFFERS
A LOSS OF PROFIT AS A CONSEQUENCE, MAY THE STATE

61.

THIE MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1979); see R.
§ 4.2 (1986).
41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (1982); see R. WALLICK, supra note 61, at § 4.3.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1491 (1982); see R. WALLICK, supra note 61, at § 4.3.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982); see R. WALLICK, supra note 61, at § 4.3.
See also R. WALLICK, supra note 61, at § 4.4.

WALLICK, CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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INVOKE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A BAR TO AN ACTION
73
ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT?
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the decision of the district
court, holding that "where the state has entered into a contract fairly
authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from [an] action arising from
the state's breach of that contract. ' 74 The decision marked the first
time that the Supreme Court of Florida was willing to recede from
precedent holding that the State may not be sued on a contract with75
out express consent to the suit.
Looking to legislative intent in the general law, the court reasoned
that where the Legislature has "authorized entities of the state to enter into . . . contract[s], the legislature has clearly intended that such
contracts be valid and binding on both parties. As a matter of law, the
state must be obligated to the private citizen or the legislative authorization for such action is void and meaningless. ' 76 The court explained
that as a matter of "basic hornbook law," a contract which is not
mutually enforceable is an illusory contract. 77 "Where one party retains to itself the option of fulfilling or declining to fulfill its obligations under the contract, there is no valid contract and neither side
7
may be bound."a
The court also found that no mutuality of remedy existed. 79 Following one of its own recent decisions,80 the court rejected the Department of Corrections' contention that, despite the alleged inequality of
the parties' positions, the mutuality-of-remedy requirement would be
satisfied by Pan-Am Tobacco's unrestricted opportunity to bring a
claims bill8 before the Legislature. The court responded that it could

73. Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 425 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983), rev'd, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
74. Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 5.
75. See Gay v. Southern Builders, Inc., 66 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1953); Bloxham v. Florida Cent.
& Peninsular R.R., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902 (1895).
76. Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 5. The court noted that its decision was not the first
time it had relied on legislative intent to find a sovereign amenable to suit. Id. at 5-6. In Manatee
County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1978), the court found that the Legislature had clearly intended for the county to participate in the resolution of a taxation dispute, and
that when the county nonetheless ignored its statutory duty, the courts had jurisdiction to fashion a remedy in equity. Id. at 148.
77. Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 5. (citing Howard Cole & Co. v. Williams, 157 Fla.
851, 27 So. 2d 352 (1946)).
78. Id. (citing Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange-Crush Co., 291 F. 102 (S.D. Fla.
1923), aff'd, 296 F. 693 (5th Cir. 1924)).
79. Id.
80. See Stack v. Dunn, 444 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1984).
81. A claims bill is a special bill brought by a party before the Legislature for reimbursement for a claim against the State. Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 5; see also supra text accompanying note 54.
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not, "in good conscience, hold that the chance to seek an act of grace
82
from the legislature is [a] sufficient remedy to create mutuality."
The supreme court's holding in Pan-Am Tobacco seems clear"the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an
action arising from the state's breach of [a] . . . contract. 8' 3 However, the court added limiting language at the end of its opinion: "our
holding here is applicable only to suits on express, written con8 4
tracts."1
This language caused confusion in the district courts as to

whether the supreme court's holding was limited to express conditions
of express contracts, or whether it extended to implied conditions of
express contracts. The Second District Court of Appeal faced this is85
sue in Southern Roadbuilders v. Lee County.
C. Southern Roadbuilders Interprets Pan-Am Tobacco Narrowly
Southern Roadbuilders entered into a $5.2 million written contract
with Lee County for the construction of air carrier aprons, fueling
systems, airfield lighting, and service roads for the Southwest Florida
Regional Airport in Lee County. The written contract between the
parties stipulated that the job would be completed within 158 days of
commencement of the project.8 7 After Southern Roadbuilders was
forty-eight days into the project, almost one-third of the way to completion, Lee County revised the plans for the project's underground
drain system's inlet structures. 8 As a result of complying with Lee
County's revision to the original plans within the deadline specified by
the contract, Southern Roadbuilders claimed an additional $840,729
in costs and expenses.8 9 Southern Roadbuilders subsequently filed a
three-count complaint against Lee County alleging three bases of recovery: breach of contract, quantum meruit, and inaccurate job specifications. 9° The trial court, purporting to apply Pan-Am Tobacco,
dismissed all three counts, finding that sovereign immunity barred recovery as to each. 91
Although the Second District agreed with the trial court that PanAm Tobacco was controlling, it was unpersuaded that a breach of the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 5.
Id.
Id.
495 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987).
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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written contract had occurred. 92 The court rejected Southern Roadbuilders' contention that Lee County's vacillation on the plans for the
underground drainage of the project, which necessitated the incurring
of additional costs, amounted to a breach of an implied contractual
duty of reasonable cooperation. Instead, the court found that
Southern Roadbuilders was unlawfully seeking the enforcement of a
new and separate oral contract regarding the payment of the extra expenses and that these additional costs were addressed neither in the
93
original contract nor in any subsequent legally operative instrument.
Consequently, the Second District held that Southern Roadbuilders'
claims were not founded upon an express, written contract and there94
fore were barred under Pan-Am Tobacco.
The Second District's narrow interpretation of Pan-Am Tobacco
led it to reject Southern Roadbuilders' argument that its action for
recovery, which was based on Lee County's breach of the implied
warranties of the contract-reasonable cooperation, and payment of
additional expenses-was within the scope of Pan-Am Tobacco. The
Second District's holding in Southern Roadbuilders stands for the
proposition that an action arising from a state agency's breach of an
implied covenant or condition of an express, written contract between
a private party and the State can not be maintained. In other words,
the Second District found that only a suit based on the State's breach
of an express covenant or condition of an express, written contract
will be actionable.
D.

Champagne-Webber Extends Pan-Am Tobacco
to Implied Covenants

Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal in ChampagneWebbee 5 was faced with an issue similar to the one in Southern Roadbuilders, it declined to follow the Second District's strict interpretation. 96 Instead, it construed the supreme court's holding in Pan-Am
Tobacco to mean that the defense of sovereign immunity is unavailable to a state agency defending against an action arising out of not
only an express condition, but also an implied covenant or condition

92. Id.
93. "Although the record contains evidence of unsigned change orders documenting this
additional expense, the original contract does not provide for such additional expense and the
record is devoid of any other properly executed, written instructions which would incorporate
the terms of these additional expenses into the original contract." Id.
94. Id.
95. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 11 -23,
96. Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA
1988).
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of an express contract.97 Realizing the importance of its decision, the
court recognized the direct conflict between its decision and Southern
Roadbuildersbut noted its belief that its decision was not in conflict
with Pan-Am Tobacco.9
Attempting to explain the rulings of the Southern Roadbuilders
court and the lower court to the contrary, the Fourth District pointed
to the limiting language found at the end of the Pan-Am Tobacco
opinion.9 According to the Champagne-Webber court, interpreting
this language to mean that the defense of sovereign immunity is still
available to a state agency defending against a breach of an implied
covenant or condition of an express written contract is much narrower
than the supreme court intended.1l° In support of this determination,
the court stated the following:
The reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court in the Pan-Am
Tobacco case was that the legislature, in authorizing a state agency
to enter into a contract, clearly intended that such contracts be valid
and binding on both parties and, thus, mutually enforceable against
both. While the Court emphasized that its holding was restricted to
suits on express, written contracts into which the state agency had
statutory authority to enter, there is no indication that the Court
intended by its decision to otherwise change established principles of
contract law.' 0'
According to the Champagne-Webber court, "jv]irtually every contract contains implied covenants and conditions,"

0

2

exemplified by

the fact that "every contract includes an implied covenant that the
parties will perform in good faith." 3
The court noted that the contract between the City and Champagne-Webber, Inc. required the contractor to perform all work 'expressly or impliedly required to be furnished and done by the
contractor under the contract." ' 1 4 In light of this requirement, the

97. Id. at 698.
98. Id. at 698 n.2.
99. Id. at 697.
100. In the first footnote to the Champagne- Webber opinion, the court explained that the
Third District Court of Appeal had expressed a somewhat similar view in Dade County v. American Re-Insurance Co., 467 So. 2d 414, 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), which involved "a contract
action against Dade County, wherein the court held that this limiting language would not preclude a claim for interest, even though the contract had no express provision concerning [interest], where interest on a liquidated debt is implied by law." Champagne- Webber, 519 So. 2d at
697 n.l.
101. Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 697 (citation omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 698 (quoting the contract).
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court found it illogical and unfair for a court to construe the restrictive language of Pan-Am Tobacco'01 to abrogate the defense of sovereign immunity with respect to a breach of an express covenant or
condition of an express, written contract, but not with respect to a
°
breach of an implied covenant or condition of the same contract.' 0
Such an outcome would effectively place the court's imprimatur on a
contract tainted by the grossly inequitable bargaining positions of the
parties to the contract.
The Champagne-Webber decision marked the first time that a Florida court was willing to hold a state agency accountable for its breach
of an implied covenant or condition of a statutorily authorized contract. The court made it clear that sovereign immunity no longer
would allow a state agency to escape liability for any type of breach of
a written contract, including breaches of implied covenants and conditions. 10
III.

WHY A BROADER INTERPRETATION OF

PAN-AM

TOBACCO SHOULD

PREVAIL OVER A NARROWER ONE
In Pan-Am Tobacco the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the State from an action arising from the State's breach of an express, written contract
entered into under statutory authority. 0 8 The Second District Court of
Appeal, in Southern Roadbuilders, interpreted the Pan-Am Tobacco
holding to mean that a suit arising from the State's breach of implied
covenants and conditions of an express, written contract would be
barred by sovereign immunity.' °9 However, in Champagne-Webber,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that sovereign immunity would not protect the State from liability arising from its breach
of implied covenants and conditions of a statutorily authorized express, written contract." 0 The Fourth District's logical extension of
Pan-Am Tobacco is more reasonable than the Second District's interpretation and should be followed.

105. Pan-Am Tobacco v. Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984). "Where
the legislature has . . . authorized entities of the state to enter into ... [a] contract, the legislature has clearly intended that such contracts be valid and binding on both parties." Id. "It is
basic hornbook law that a contract which is not mutually enforceable is an illusory contract.
Where one party retains to itself the option of fulfilling or declining to fulfill its obligations
under the contract, there is no valid contract and neither side may be bound." Id.
106. Champagne- Webber, 519 So. 2d at 698.
107. Id.
108. Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 4.
109. Southern Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Lee County, 495 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review
denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1987).
110. Champagne-Webber, 519 So. 2d at 696.
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In determining that the Pan-Am Tobacco decision covers implied,
as well as express, covenants and conditions, the Champagne-Webber
court necessarily conducted, although never expressly stating so, what
amounts to a two-step analysis."' First, the Champagne-Webber court
must have determined whether implied covenants necessarily are incorporated into express contracts. If so, the court must have determined next whether the implied covenants should be incorporated to
the extent that Pan-Am Tobacco makes the defense of sovereign immunity unavailable in actions arising from the State's breach of an
implied covenant to the express, written contract. The ChampagneWebber court concluded that certain, necessary implied covenants are
incorporated into express, written contracts to the extent that sovereign immunity is unavailable under the holding of Pan-Am Tobacco.
A.

Implied Covenants are Crucial to Every Express Contract

Basic principles of contract law teach that three possible types of
covenants or conditions exist in any contract: express, implied in fact,
or implied in law (constructive)." 2 Express covenants or conditions are
those made by agreement of the parties and expressed in definite language, oral or written, when the contract is made." 3 Implied in fact
covenants or conditions are those in which the intentions of the parties are not put into specific words," 4 but rather are 'gathered from
the terms of the contract as a matter of interpretation.""'" Implied in
law, or constructive, covenants or conditions are those supplied by the
court when the parties to a contract have omitted a term essential to a
1 6
determination of the parties' rights and duties under the contract. '
The Southern Roadbuilders and Champagne-Webber decisions were
concerned with the second type-implied in fact covenants or conditions flowing from a written contract. Specifically at issue in the two
cases were the implied in fact covenant of good faith and the implied
in fact condition that the owner of a construction project provide rea-

I1. In Pan-Am Tobacco, given the facts of that case, the supreme court could only address
the issue of express conditions of a written contract. See Pan-Am Tobacco, 471 So. 2d at 4-5;
supra text accompanying notes 68-70. Implied covenants and conditions were not at issue in PanAm Tobacco. Thus, even if the court had addressed the effect of implied covenants and conditions, the resulting conclusions by the court would have only been dictum.
112. S. WILLISTON, supra note 56, at § 668.
113. 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 631 (1960).
114. Id.
115. J. CALAIAIU & J. PERiLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-6 (2d ed. 1977) (quoting CosTGAN, THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 50 (2d ed. 1927)).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226(c) (1979).

914

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 17:899

sonably accurate plans and specifications from which the project can
be constructed. 117
Because express conditions and implied in fact conditions both stem
directly from the actions of the parties to the agreement, it is often
difficult, especially with oral contracts, to determine whether the condition is one which has been spelled out or whether it is one which is
implied in fact from the words and conduct of the parties."' But,
"Ij]ust as parties can make promises without using words to do so,
they can also express an intention that a fact or event shall be a condition of legal duty without putting it into words." 19 Further, implied
in fact conditions are often expressed by the very nature of the thing
agreed upon, rather than in the usual or appropriate language.' 20 For
example, "[a] promise to deliver goods necessarily involves the condition that the promisee will take delivery [and] a promise to repair another's house involves the condition that the promisor will be allowed
access to the house."'' Thus, implied in fact conditions are generally
connected to the promise of cooperation' 22 or good faith' 21-a promise
to perform a necessary, but unstated condition precedent. 124 For example, X and Y enter into a written agreement for X to paint Y's
house and for Y to supply the paint. X cannot perform unless Y supplies the paint. Thus, Y's supplying the paint is an implied in fact
condition to X's duty to paint, even though the written agreement
does not contain such a provision. 12 Further, Y would have an implied obligation to supply a sufficient quantity of paint and X would
likewise have an implied obligation not to waste the paint.
As the above examples illustrate, express conditions and implied in
fact conditions both depend completely upon the manifested inten-

117. Southern Roadbuilders' third count against Lee County was for deficient plans and
specifications as they related to the underground drainage system. Southern Roadbuilders, Inc.
v. Lee County, 495 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.
1987). Further, the record indicates that Lee County, by refusing to sign the necessary change
orders, did not act in good faith. Id. Similarly, in Champagne- Webber, the plans were defective
as to the subsurface soil conditions, for which the City refused to provide additional compensation. Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
118. J. CALAMAI&J. PERaao,supranote 115, at § 11-6.
119. A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at § 631.
120. S. WILLISTON, supranote 56, at § 668.
121. Id.
122. J. CALAMAaJ& J. PERLLO, supra note 115, at § 11-12.
123. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform In Good Faith, 94
HAv. L. REv. 369 (1980) (discussing the doctrine of good faith performance exclusively in the
breach of contract context).
124. See, e.g., Mainieri v. Magnuson, 126 Cal. App. 2d 426, 272 P.2d 557 (1954); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1932).
125. J. CALAMARI&J. PERiLLO, supranote 115, at §11-12.
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tions of the parties and have the same sanctity as the promise itself. 26
Indeed, just as with express covenants, a contract becomes meaningless without the implied in fact covenants. Thus, legal scholars profess
that implied in fact conditions are to be treated the same as express
conditions. 2 7 The Supreme Court of Florida also has recognized that
unwritten terms will be implied as part of the contract if: (1) they are
so necessarily involved in the contractual relationship that the parties
must have intended them; and (2) the parties failed to express them

2
only because they were too obvious to need expression. 1
The two implied covenants at issue in Southern Roadbuilders and
Champagne-Webber are not trivial concerns; rather, they are critical
conditions that transcend the very effectiveness of the contractual
agreement. A contract in which either party may act in bad faith or do
anything it likes, even if such action hinders, delays, obstructs, or misleads the other party, is really no contract at all. According to Williston, "[tihe underlying principle is that there is an implied covenant
that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the rights of the other party to receive the fruits
of the contract.' ' 2 9 Implied covenants such as those in ChampagneWebber and Southern Roadbuilders are necessary to ensure the mutuality of an agreement. If the parties had decided to incorporate these
covenants into the written agreement, however, there would have been
little dispute over their application. No party would agree to the addition of a good faith clause that would apply to one of the contracting
parties, but not the other. The only reason such covenants are not
formally included in the contract is because they are too obvious to
require expression.
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, such as the one
in Champagne-Webber, undoubtedly should be incorporated into an
express contract; it is so material to the contract that had the parties
discussed it prior to entering into their agreement, they would have
recognized it as being necessary. "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement."' 30 Many jurisdictions have followed this reasoning to

126. S. WILLISTON, supra note 56, at § 669.
127. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 115, at § 11-6; A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at §
631; S. WILLISTON, supra note 56, at §§ 668-69.
128. Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950).
129. S. WILuSTON, supra note 56, at § 670; see Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,
262 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
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find an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts, including those for construction of public works.",
The importance and necessity of implied in fact covenants and conditions have been recognized in Florida. In construction cases alone,
Florida courts have developed a myriad of implied covenants that, unless expressly provided otherwise in the contract, will control. These
include: an implied covenant that the contractor will perform the job
with the skill and care commensurate with that in the industry;' 3 2 an
implied covenant that the project can be built from certain plans and
specifications, where the contractor is bound to build according to
plans and specifications provided by the owner, relieving the contractor from responsibility for project defects resulting from any deficiency in the plans or specifications; " an implied obligation not to do

131. See Eliel v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 461 (Cl. Ct. 1989); Travelers Indem. Co. v. United
States, 16 Cl. Ct. 142 (Cl. Ct. 1988); Zurn Eng'rs v. State Dep't of Water Resources, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 138 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); A.C. Shaw
Constr., Inc. v. Washoe County, 784 P.2d 9 (Nev. 1989); W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 562 A.2d 222 (1989); City of San Antonio v. Forgy, 769 S.W.2d
293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); see also Burton, supra note 123, app. at 404 (listing jurisdictions
which explicitly recognize an obligation of good faith performance in every contract at common
law).
In addition to those jurisdictions which have found an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to exist in express contracts, several jurisdictions have found many other types of implied
covenants and conditions to exist in express contracts. Examples include: an implied covenant
not to do anything which would deprive other parties to the contract of the benefits of the
contract, Zurn Eng'rs, 69 Cal. App. 3d at 833, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 500; People ex rel. Dep't of
Parks & Recreation v. West-A-Rama, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 786, 790, 111 Cal Rptr. 197, 199
(Ct. App. 1974), an implied covenant not to hinder the performance of the other parties to a
contract, Buckley & Co. v. State, 140 N.J. Super. 289, 296, 356 A.2d 56, 68 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975), an implied condition that compliance with plans and specifications will result in a
timely completion of the project, id., an implied covenant by a landlord to assure the quiet
enjoyment of leased premises, Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dane County, 142 Wis. 2d 315,
323, 417 N.W. 2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 1987); Q C Corp. v. Maryland Port Admin., 68 Md. App.
181, 198, 510 A.2d 1101, 1110 (Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Kane v. New Hampshire State Liquor
Comm'n, 118 N.H. 706, 709, 393 A.2d 555, 557 (1978) (citing 3 G. THOMPSON, MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 1112 (rev. 1959); 2 R. POWELL, REa.L PROPERTY § 225[3] (rev. 1977)), an
implied covenant by a tenant not to commit waste on the premises, San Nicolas v. United States,
617 F.2d 246, 249 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Kane, 118 N.H. at 709, 393 A.2d at 557 (citing United States v.
Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876); R. POWELL, supra, at § 636 n.3), and an implied covenant by a
landlord to furnish a tenant with a habitable dwelling, Kane, 118 N.H. at 706, 393 A.2d at 555
(citing Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
132. See Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 264 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.
1959).
133. Bradford Builders, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 270 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1959); see
Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Auth. v. Inman, Inc., 402 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), cert.
denied, 412 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1982); City of Miami v. Nat Harrison Assocs., 313 So. 2d 99 (Fla.
3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1976); City of Orlando v. H.L. Coble Constr.
Co., 282 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973); Shore Drive Apartments, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 253 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).

1990]

SO VEREIGN IMMUNITY

anything to hinder, obstruct, or delay the performance of the other
party;' 3 an implied obligation on the owner's part not to furnish information which would tend to mislead prospective bidders; ' an implied covenant that the owner will pay additional compensation for
requiring performance of additional work not within the scope of the
written contract; 3 6 and an implied covenant that a no-damages-fordelay clause is invalid where the owner is responsible for willful de37

lay. 1

Thus, courts in Florida and other jurisdictions regularly incorporate
various types of implied in fact covenants into express contracts. In
particular, these courts have recognized the significance of the implied
in fact covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and accordingly have
incorporated them into express contracts such as those for public
works construction.13 Using basic principles of contract law and
sound logical reasoning, these courts, as well as the Champagne-Webber court, have concluded that implied in fact covenants should be
incorporated into express contracts.
B.

Pan-Am Tobacco's Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity Should
Extend to Implied Covenants of Express Contracts

A primary rationale of the Pan-Am Tobacco decision was to prevent contracts between the State and private parties from being illu39
sory, that is, to ensure that such contracts are mutually enforceable.
If the State is not required to abide by the implied covenants and conditions of its contracts while opposing private parties are, a clear lack
of mutuality of obligation exists. '4 If no mutuality of obligation exists, the contract is void.' 4' Because implied in fact conditions are as
necessary to the express, written contract as are express conditions,

134. See Cement Roofing Indus. v. Morgan Constr. Co., 276 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973);
Gulf American Land Corp. v. Wain, 166 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
135. See Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 362 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978).
136. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Acme Elec. Contractors, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1187
(Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
137. See Southern Gulf Utils. v. Boca Ciega Sanitary Dist., 238 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA),
cert. denied, 240 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1970).
138. Eliel v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 461 (Cl. Ct. 1989); Travelers Indem. Co. v. United
States, 16 Cl. Ct. 142 (Cl. Ct. 1988); Zurn Eng'rs v. State Dep't of Water Resources, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 138 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); A.C. Shaw
Constr., Inc. v. Washoe County, 784 P.2d 9 (Nev. 1989); W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 562 A.2d 222 (1989); City of San Antonio v. Forgy, 769 S.W.2d
293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
139. Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (1984).
140. A. CORBIN, supra note 113, at § 152.
141. Id.
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their incorporation into the Pan-Am Tobacco decision must trump
any archaic, fading purpose remaining for sovereign immunity.
Several public policy arguments support an extension of Pan-Am
Tobacco to implied covenants and conditions of express contracts.
First, the State, as represented by its various agencies, already enjoys
an advantageous bargaining position as compared to the various private parties with whom it contracts. Regardless of how large the private contracting party may be, the State will always have the
42
advantageous bargaining position.
Second, given its inherent bargaining advantage, the State should
not be allowed the further luxury of acting in bad faith with respect to
its contracts with private parties and then shielding itself with sovereign immunity. Here, more than ever, the State should be required to
"'turn square corners' rather than exploit litigation or bargaining ad'1 43
vantages that might otherwise not be available to private citizens.
"To hold otherwise would suggest that a governmental entity has a
right to refrain from cooperation in a contract, or that a governmental entity could act in bad faith, calculated to destroy the benefit
of that contract to the other contracting party." 1 "
Third, allowing the State to invoke sovereign immunity as a defense
against claims arising from the State's breach of an implied covenant
or condition adversely affects the public at large as well as the contractor. Inherent in all construction projects is the need for "flexibility to make changes to the scope of the work and deal with job
contingencies without having to stop the job in the middle to negotiate
with a contractor over what extra money will be involved.' ' 45 This
flexibility is lost under the Southern Roadbuilders interpretation because a contractor who performs additional work before acquiring a
signed change order runs the risk of the state agency not paying for
the additional work and then invoking the defense of sovereign immunity.m46 As a result, the cost of public contracts would increase because
contractors, "knowing that they would have to bear the cost of each
and every deficiency that might arise, would have to include in their
original bids sufficient sums to protect against this risk."1 47 Ironically,
although a main purpose of sovereign immunity is to protect the pub-

'142. See City of San Antonio v. Forgy, 769 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
143. W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 561, 562 A. 2d
222, 231 (1989) (citing F.M.C. Stores, Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 495 A.2d
1313 (1985)).
144. A.C. Shaw Constr., Inc. v. Washoe County, 784 P.2d 9, 10 (Nev. 1989).
145. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 12.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 12-13.
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lic treasury, 4 allowing the State to invoke it with respect to implied
covenants and conditions of express contracts thus would have a detri49
mental effect on the public treasury as well.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Pan-Am Tobacco expressed its
desire that statutorily authorized state contracts be valid and binding
on both parties to the contract. 50 Given this desire, it makes sense to
afford either party the opportunity to sue for the other's breach of
any and all covenants and conditions, express and implied, which bind
the parties. Basic contract principles and public policy considerations
support such a result, which allows private parties who enter into statutorily authorized contracts to stand on equal footing with the State
when entering into and performing under state contracts.
C.

Alternatives to Champagne-Webber

Under the Champagne-Webber interpretation of Pan-Am Tobacco,
the State will be unable to invoke the defense of sovereign immunity
when faced with a claim arising from the State's breach of an implied
covenant or condition of a contract. Although this result appears to
be the most desirable for parties contracting with the State, alternatives to the Champagne-Webber result exist. These alternatives include
following the Southern Roadbuilders' interpretation and requiring the
aggrieved party to seek redress through a claims bill, instituting a special court of claims to handle suits brought against the State, and establishing an arbitration board for the same purpose.
First, Florida could follow the line of reasoning established by the
Southern Roadbuilders court and refuse to extend the abrogation of
sovereign immunity to implied covenants and conditions of express,
written contracts. The result of this option, as discussed above, is patently unfair, as the State would be enhancing its already advantageous
bargaining position by not being required to adhere to the implied
covenants and conditions of its express, written contracts while opposing private parties would be so required. Following the Southern
Roadbuilders' interpretation would require an aggrieved party seeking
redress to submit a claims bill to the Legislature. This option, however, cannot be considered a viable one. As the supreme court recognized in Pan-Am Tobacco, the very small rate of success enjoyed by
claimants renders the procedure a clearly insufficient remedy.'"'
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The second alternative is to institute a court of claims to exclusively
handle lawsuits brought against the State. Florida could base its court
of claims on one existing in another state such as Illinois.' 5 2 The Illinois Court of Claims consists of three judges appointed for terms of
six years'53 by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 5 4 The Secretary of State serves as the ex officio clerk of the
court.' Determinations of the Illinois Court of Claims are binding
upon the parties;'5 6 however, a new trial may be granted if a claimant
can show sufficient grounds for a new trial under the rules of common law or equity.5 7 Illinois law sets forth a two-year statute of limitations for most cases.' Florida also could consider the model used
by the United States Claims Court, 5 9 which, since 1885, has heard a
myriad of grievances and claims including contract actions. 160 The
court of claims alternative is a viable one which deserves serious consideration.
A third and final alternative is the establishment of an arbitration
board to hear contract claims, similar to the existing Florida State
Road Arbitration Board.' 61 A "Florida State Contract Arbitration
Board" could exclusively hear claims based on contractual disputes
between state agencies and the various private contractors with whom
they contract. Florida's State Road Arbitration Board' 62 was established "[t]o facilitate the prompt settlement of claims for additional
compensation arising out of construction contracts between the department [of transportation] and the various contractors with whom it
transacts business."'' 63 The State Contracts Arbitration Board would
be established to hear all state contract claims not already covered by
an arbitration statute. Unlike the State Road Arbitration Board,
which hears only contractual claims that amount to no more than
$100,000 per contract,'6 the Contract Arbitration Board should not
have a monetary limitation, as many claims for contractual damages
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ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
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can be inflated or deflated, using well-drafted delay damage provisions and the like, to suit a party's desire to submit, or not submit, its
claim to arbitration.
This final alternative, establishing an arbitration board, appears to
be the most desirable. In addition to providing, as a court of claims
would, a specific forum for the resolution of contractual claims
against the State, it would provide the additional benefit of having the
claim heard by board members qualified and experienced in the area.
As is done for the State Road Arbitration Board, one member could
be chosen by the state agency, one by the private contracting party,
and the third by agreement of the two appointed members.16 Having
adjudicators with specific contractual experience, rather than just contract experience generally, makes the establishment of an arbitration
board the preferred alternative.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Sovereign immunity has an "historical basis steeped in antiquity
and antedating the establishment of any organized government on the
continent.' 66 Nevertheless, in 1984 the Supreme Court of Florida
joined other states by ruling in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections67 that the doctrine no longer would be available
to the State as a defense to actions arising from the State's breach of
. an express contract. Because that case involved the breach of an express condition of an express contract, and because the court added
limiting language at the end of its opinion, it was unclear whether the
court's abrogation of sovereign immunity extended to situations
where the claim arose from the State's breach of an implied covenant
or condition.
Two district courts deciding subsequent cases controlled by Pan-Am
Tobacco came to contrary conclusions. In Southern Roadbuilders v.
Lee County, 6 the Second District Court of Appeal essentially held
that the supreme court's decision was limited to express conditions of
express contracts. 69 In Champagne Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,170 the Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed by holding
that the supreme court's abrogation of sovereign immunity necessarily
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extends to claims arising from the State's breach of implied covenants
7
and conditions of express contracts.' '
Basic principles of contract law, as well as public policy, support
the Fourth District's interpretation. Without implied covenants, such
as one to deal in good faith, contracts are not mutually enforceable.
Florida courts, recognizing this significance, have found implied covenants to exist in a variety of contexts. Moreover, although the doctrine of sovereign immunity was developed to protect the state
treasury, allowing suits arising from the State's breach of an implied
covenant or condition may actually result in a net loss to the state
treasury: absent an ability to sue on such breaches, private contractors
are forced to regularly overbid on state contracts to protect themselves.
Alternatives to an outright extension of the Pan-Am Tobacco decision exist. In place of, or as a refinement to, the Champagne Webber
decision, the Florida Legislature could establish a court of claims or
arbitration board to exclusively hear contract claims against the State.
The latter alternative, comprised of members having specific expertise, is preferable to the former one. However, to ensure the realization of the supreme court's goal in Pan-Am Tobacco-to make
contracts between the State and private parties mutually enforceablethe Supreme Court of Florida should make it clear, however possible,
that the Champagne Webber decision represents a sound and logical
extension of its 1984 abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
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